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#### New 123 Agreements will have gold standard- sets an international standard- key to create Saudi and South Korea agreements with gold standard

Lewis 2012 [Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. AUGUST 1, 2012 “It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3]

Enter Taiwan. According to the National Journal report, the Obama administration, through an interagency review process, had agreed that it would not begin negotiation of a new 123 agreement with Taiwan until 2013 or 2014. Instead, it would first pursue its negotiations with a series of other countries such as South Korea. The State Department suddenly jumped Taiwan to the front of the line, sending a draft 123 agreement to the Energy Department -- at a time when that department was busy with other matters -- that contained a "no ENR" provision basically identical to the one found in the UAE agreement.¶ Why? Because someone in the State Department is apparently not willing to give up on the gold standard. Like many interagency fights, a battle over process is really a battle over substance. In this case, the order the agreements are negotiated may matter a great deal. Proponents of the gold standard would rather start with their best chance, hoping to create a precedent for following agreements. Taiwan is almost certainly the most likely candidate to make a no-ENR pledge because it has very little leverage. Taiwan is not a state, and it is not a member of the IAEA. Its safeguards agreements are administered through the United States. If Taiwan walks away from its agreement with the United States, it has no other partners. We should not be at all surprised that someone at the State Department who would put a no-ENR provision in the Taiwan draft would also try to jump it forward in the queue.¶ By the same token, if you believe that the "gold standard" is a dangerous illusion that will prevent the United States from reaching many important 123 agreements, you do not want to negotiate with Taiwan first. You would see Taiwan in the same way you see the UAE -- a sui generis case unlikely to be replicated that creates a misleading impression about U.S. leverage over certain partners. And you would hope no one spoke Latin.¶ Happily, I can explain this in plain English: "One is an accident; two is a coincidence; three is a trend." Someone at the State Department is trying to start a trend. He or she is probably tired of hearing the argument that negotiating another "gold standard" 123 agreement is not possible, when he or she knows opportunities do exist. If the administration really can persuade Taiwan and Jordan to agree to accept the gold standard, doing so will demonstrate that the United States can negotiate nuclear trade agreements that also have strong nonproliferation provisions. And this, in turn, will put pressure on the tougher cases, like South Korea and Saudi Arabia, to conform with what will appear to be an emerging global standard -- 24 carats and nothing less.

#### The aff shifts the focus of leadership efforts from nonproliferation to industry advantage- that ensures 123 Agreements without the gold standard

Hibbs 2012 [Mark Hibbs senior associate nuclear policy program Carnegie Endowment AUGUST 7, 2012 “Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements” http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z]

Some administration officials, supported by lawmakers, sought to universalize the UAE no-ENR provision as a “gold standard” for all future agreements, but others preferred instead to apply it on a limited case-by-case basis.¶ Since 2004, when the Bush administration proposed that ENR technologies be restricted to the few states currently having them—which includes the United States—many countries have objected that this would violate their “rights” to peaceful nuclear development, expressed in both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statute and in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¶ The United States sought to codify this ban in nuclear trade guidelines upheld by the 46-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, but had to settle for a criteria-based approach adopted by the group in June 2011. Last fall, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced legislation that would set forth a blanket requirement that countries entering into nuclear cooperation with the United States forego ENR.¶ But neither Congress nor the administration at a senior level has set a firm policy course on what should be required in future 123 agreements, leaving it up to negotiators themselves to follow recommendations arising from lower-level internal deliberations. In practice, this means that there has been a strong difference of views between the State Department, which at high levels supports making the “gold standard” a requirement in all 123 agreements, and the Department of Energy, which favors a more differentiated approach also favored by the U.S. nuclear industry. ¶ Currently, there is an interagency understanding that the State Department will aim to negotiate no-ENR provisions into nearly all future 123 agreements and that any exceptions to the no-ENR outcome must be jointly authorized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu.

#### Gold Standard prevents Saudi Prolif- overcomes previous barriers

Sayler 2011 [Kelley Sayler is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues AUG 2, 2011 CSIS “The Wisdom of a U.S.-Saudi Arabia 123 Agreement?” http://csis.org/blog/wisdom-us-saudi-arabia-123-agreement]

Global Security Newswire reported last week that the Obama administration appears poised to launch into discussions with Saudi Arabia on a possible 123 agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. 123 agreements are not, however, without substantial risk, establishing the legal framework for the export of nuclear reactors and dual-use materials as well as the exchange of technical knowledge. If abused, such exports can expand the ability of states to construct military weapons programs under the cover of civilian energy programs, while also compressing the timeline for nuclear acquisition. ¶ Particularly worrisome in the Saudi case is the potential departure from the Gold Standard established by the UAE 123 agreement. If, as has been suggested, the Saudi agreement is concluded without an explicit commitment to abjure reprocessing and enrichment technologies, there could be profound consequences for the administration’s nonproliferation objectives and for the long-term stability of the Middle East.¶ ¶ By and large Saudi Arabia has not been previously judged to be a proliferation threat. As Thomas Lipmann notes in The Nuclear Tipping Point, Saudi Arabia “lacks the technological expertise, industrial base, and disciplined commitment required to develop an indigenous weapons capacity.” Recent developments, however, may have altered Saudi Arabia’s interest in nuclear weapons. For example, the alacrity with which the United States dispensed of its long-standing support for the regime of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak no doubt gave pause to the House of Saud, which continues – 30 years later – to be troubled by American abandonment of the Shah on the eve of the Iranian revolution. Nor is Saudi threat perception likely to be relieved by the regional meddling of its frequent ideological competitor. This is to say nothing of the Kingdom’s serious concerns regarding Iranian weaponization.¶ ¶ Indeed, Saudi Arabia appears increasingly unnerved by the trajectory of the Iranian program, a trend that can be seen in the country’s shifting characterizations of its own nuclear ambitions. For example, Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal responded to a 2003 Guardian report that the country was “prepared to contemplate the nuclear option” by stating that “although, like all governments, we constantly reconsider our policies in the light of events, we do not have and are not considering acquiring nuclear weapons.” Contrast this with Turki’s recent assertion that Iranian nuclear acquisition “would compel Saudi Arabia to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences," and it is clear that Saudi discomfort is growing. ¶ ¶ Given these developments, it seems possible that the Kingdom could be prompted to reconsider its policy of nuclear abstinence, and that, if so, a nuclear energy agreement could provide the means of circumventing the country’s technological and industrial deficiencies. ¶ ¶ This is all the more the case because, as Lippman explains,¶ ¶ The credibility of Saudi disclaimers of interest in nuclear weapons has been reinforced by the fact that Saudi Arabia, unlike Iran, has never sought to acquire commercial nuclear power generating plants…Because energy, in the form of crude oil and natural gas, is the one natural resource Saudi Arabia possesses in abundance, no proposal for nuclear power would be credible.¶ ¶ If Lippman is correct, then the Saudi interest in a 123 agreement would seem suspect and, at any rate, should be approached with caution and an eye towards securing the Gold Standard pioneered by the UAE 123. In the absence of such a commitment, the United States risks contributing to the Middle East’s next nuclear weapons program. ¶ ¶ And while the administration may argue that the development of a Saudi nuclear program is inevitable and should therefore occur under the direction of Washington’s watchful eye, any decision to grant a 123 agreement to a non-nuclear weapons state without an attendant Gold Standard commitment would not only threaten a nascent precedent that is highly beneficial to the nonproliferation regime but also deliver the United States to the “deadly adversary" of fatalism, a prospect that President Obama has rightly rejected. Rather than assuming the inevitability of a Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement – and conceding key nonproliferation objectives as a result – the Obama administration should instead seek to resolve Saudi concerns regarding the Gold Standard and encourage the Saudis to assume a leadership role in the nonproliferation regime.

#### Extinction

Eric Edelman et al (Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense) and Andrew Krepinevich (President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment) and Evan Montgomery (Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) February 2011 “The dangers of a nuclear Iran” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also ordered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of di⁄cult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

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#### Natural gas demand is picking up- prevents a glut from collapsing the industry- other power sources could trade off

Malik and Buurma 10-19[Naureen S. Malik and Christine Buurma 10-19-2012 Bloomberg “Natural Gas Rises to 10-Month High as Power Plants Buoy Demand” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-19/natural-gas-rises-to-2012-high-as-power-plants-buoy-demand]

Natural gas advanced to a 10-month high in New York on speculation that above-normal demand from electricity generators will help reduce a supply surplus.¶ Gas rose 0.8 percent after an Energy Department report yesterday showed inventories expanded by 51 billion cubic feet, less than the five-year average gain of 71 billion for the week. Supplies climbed 106 billion a year earlier. Power plants are burning record amounts of the fuel this year as seasonal prices near decade lows prompted switching from coal.¶ “Natural gas is still being consumed in the electric power sector without being displaced by coal,” said Tom Saal, senior vice president of energy trading at INTL Hencorp Futures LLC in Miami. “We’ll see how long that lasts as we go into winter if prices go higher.”

#### Every renewable dollar takes money out of natural gas investment- even if it doesn’t actually make the market

Downey 2012 [Richard Downey Unatego Area Landowners Association 2012 JULY 29 “Natural Gas vs. Subsidized Renewables Is No Contest” http://eidmarcellus.org/marcellus-shale/renewables-versus-natural-gas-no-contest/11392/]

A “fractivist” ended the recent Otsego County Natural Gas Advisory Committee’s meeting by intoning the following statement: A dollar spent on natural gas is one less dollar spent on renewables.¶ Very deep, but what does this mean? It’s probably about subsidies, so let’s scroll back to Economics 101.¶ Demand determines where money is spent in free markets. However, in command-and-control societies, the money goes where the kings and commissars (the elites) deem it best. Our society is a little of both, but thankfully, still more of the former. So, in spite of loan guarantees, tax credits, state supported rebates, state mandates and quotas, direct subsidies and grants, and manipulated tariffs, renewables still fail to make the market.¶ Take solar heated homes. After decades of popularization and righteous approval, and with tons of subsidies, solar heated homes are still marginal in the United States. According to the 2010 Census (American Community Survey), there are only 38,000 in the entire country. In contrast, there are 57,000,000 homes heated with natural gas. Why? Natural gas is cheaper, more reliable, more adaptable to a mass market (i.e., scaleable), and more builder friendly. In other words, people like it.¶ This holds true for wind, biomass, hydro, wave, geothermal and other forms of renewable energy. Renewables gobble up massive subsidies and, yet, are nowhere near fossil fuel pricing. Competitive? Not even with the pork barrel.¶ But, hey, that doesn’t mean people can’t make a buck on them. Massive subsidies attract the wheeler/dealers and the crony capitalists. Never mind the business wont fly. When Uncle Sam picks up the tab, roll ‘em, and let it ride! More money where that came from, baby!

#### Natural gas cements climate leadership

**Casten 2009** (Sean Casten, president of Recycled Energy Development, December 16, 2009, “Natural gas as a near-term CO2 mitigation strategy,” Grist, http://goo.gl/b8z08)

Discussions of CO2 reduction tend to start from a presumption of near-term economic disruption coupled to long-term investment in green technology. The presumption isn’t right. The U.S. could reduce its total CO2 footprint by 14-20 percent tomorrow with no disruption in our access to energy services, without investing in any new infrastructure. The Waxman-Markey proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 17 percent over 10 years is constrained only by its ambition. This near-term opportunity would be realized by ramping up our nation’s generation of electricity from gas and ramping down our generation from coal, taking advantage only of existing assets. Its scale and potential for immediate impact deserves consideration; even partial action towards this goal would have dramatic political and environmental consequences, establishing U.S. leadership and credibility in global climate negotiations.

#### Climate leadership five extinction threats- Biodiversity, soil erosion, ocean acidification, de-fo, pollution

**Khosla 2009** (Ashok Khosla, president of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, January 27, 2009, “A new President for the United States: We have a dream,” http://goo.gl/RQsL8)

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

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#### Obama is in perfect position on the debt ceiling

Klein 1-2 [Ezra Klein 1-2-2013 Washington Post “Calm down, liberals. The White House won” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/]

Fourth, I don’t think the White House has a shred of credibility when they say they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling. They may not call what they’re about to do negotiating over the debt ceiling, but that’ll be what they’re doing. That said, I’m quite convinced that they don’t intend to be held hostage over the debt ceiling. As a former constitutional law professor, the president sees himself as a steward of the executive branch and is deeply hostile to setting the precedent that congressional minorities can hold presidents hostage through the debt ceiling. At some point in the coming talks, Boehner or McConnell or both are going to realize that the White House really, seriously will not accept a bargain in which what they “got” was an increase in the debt limit, and so they’re going to have to decide at that point whether to crash the global economy.¶ Fifth, the constellation of economic interest groups that converge on Washington understands the debt ceiling better than they did in 2011, are becoming more and more tired of congress’s tendency to negotiate by threatening to trigger economic catastrophes, and is getting better at knowing who to blame. It’s not a meaningless sign that John Engler, the former Republican Governor of Michigan who now leads the Business Roundtable, called for a five-year solution to the debt ceiling. ¶ It’s worth keeping this in perspective: All it means is that the White House can potentially demand a perfectly reasonable compromise of one dollar in revenue-generating tax reform for every dollar in spending cuts. When you add in the fiscal cliff deal, and the 2011 Budget Control Act, that’ll still mean that the total deficit reduction enacted over the last few years tilts heavily towards spending, particularly once you account for reduced war costs. ¶ But that is, arguably, another reason that the White House isn’t in such a bad position here: They’ve set up a definition of success that will sound reasonable to most people — a dollar in tax reform for a dollar in spending cuts — while the Republicans have a very unreasonable sounding definition, in which they get huge cuts to Medicare or they force the United States into default. So while it’s possible that the White House will crumble, rendering itself impotent in negotiations going forward, and while it’s possible that the we’ll breach the debt ceiling, both possibilities seem less likely than Republicans agreeing to a deal that pairs revenue-generating tax reform with spending cuts.

#### Solar investment is unpopular – republicans

Graeber 12 Daniel Graeber, reporter for Oil Price, “Solar Insanity: Why is Obama Obsessed with Solar Energy?”, Oil Price, February 13th, 2012, http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Solar-Energy/Solar-Insanity-Why-is-Obama-Obsessed-with-Solar-Energy.html

The U.S. Energy Department is throwing a lot of money at solar power recently, with California seemingly getting the bulk of the federal money. President Obama last year set some pretty ambitious renewable energy targets, by American standards, and this year called for an "all-of-the above" strategy for domestic energy. But why put so much political energy into solar? Should there be a bulk renewable energy initiative? Energy Secretary Chu last week said he was putting $12 million behind a so-called incubator program that would fund start-up and pilot solar initiatives. This falls under his department's SunShot initiative, which aims to decrease the overall costs of solar energy systems by 75 percent by 2020. This, the department said, would make it cost-effective to use solar power for as much as 18 percent of the electricity generated in the United States by 2030. The Keystone XL pipeline will have leaked more than a dozen times by then, given the track record of the existing line. Republicans aren't too keen with Obama's solar initiatives, however. They're demanding the White House fork over everything it has on bankrupt solar panel company Solyndra, which went bankrupt despite a $535 million loan guarantee. That's half-a-billion bucks! Politics aside, that's a lot of money. The White House, however, defended the measure by saying the renewable energy sector was getting very competitive and maybe some of Obama's Chicago-

#### Obama PC is key - failure collapses the global economy

Maass 1-2 [Harold Maass 1-2-2013 The Week “The looming debt-ceiling fight: Worse than the fiscal cliff?” http://theweek.com/article/index/238312/the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-worse-than-the-fiscal-cliff]

Since the agreement heading for Obama's desk doesn't raise the debt ceiling, which we've already hit, says Zachary A. Goldfarb at The Washington Post, it leaves "the Treasury to use what it calls 'extraordinary measures' as long as it can to pay the government's bills." When the bean counters run out of tricks, we could face a "catastrophic default" if Congress doesn't act fast.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation's bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.¶ Obama is still smarting from the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, says Neil Munro at The Daily Caller. In that fight, "the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion." Obama has been complaining about that defeat ever since, and he's vowing not to let it happen again. But the GOP-led House is adamant about using "its authority over the nation's debt ceiling to pressure Obama to shrink future spending."

#### Economic decline causes nuclear conflict

Mathew J. Burrows (counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), PhD in European History from Cambridge University) and Jennifer Harris (a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit) April 2009 “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_Burrows.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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**Text: The United States federal government should sign the Kyoto protocol.- Solves warming**

### Warming

#### Assign warming zero percent probability – flawed models and predictions

Craig D. Idso (founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) and Sherwood B. Idso (president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) February 2011 “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path” http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf

As presently constituted, earth’s atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas we call carbon dioxide or CO2. That’s only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earth’s atmosphere eons ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these frightening future scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that combine to determine the state of earth’s climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did -- which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way, and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise, in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming -- poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely more complex (the effect of a rise in the air’s CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater challenge to which they aspire

#### No proof of tipping points – we’ve recovered from worse temp increases

Thomas Fuller July 6, 2010. “Global warming, uncertainty, tipping points and the precautionary principle” Environmental Policy Examiner. http://www.examiner.com/environmental-policy-in-national/global-warming-uncertainty-tipping-points-and-the-precautionary-principle

Others are more optimistic, and say that if we act right now, but really right now, we can avoid crossing the line and making permanent changes. They say that because we don't know where the tipping point really is and because we do not know the extent of damage that could be caused by a permanently warmer planet, the Precautionary Principle more or less compels us to take drastic action to fight climate change. There are opposing arguments to this. One of the best arguments against the Precautionary Principle is the error it led us into the last time it was used. Then Vice President Dick Cheney argued that if there was even a 1% chance that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, then it was important to us to invade Iraq, find the weapons and institute regime change. What's important to understand about that is that Cheney was wrong, not because Hussein didn't have WMD. He was wrong in his application of logic. The first step in dealing with this type of situation is reducing the uncertainty in your calculations. For Cheney, this would have meant first, quantifying the type and amounts of WMD Hussein might realistically possess, Hussein's realistic delivery options for WMD, and his propensity to use them. Second, in a Strangelovian way, Cheney would have used existing Pentagon scenarios to calculate the damage to life and the political framework of the Middle East if Husseing used these weapons and compared it very cold-bloodedly to the losses certain to result from our intervention. The problem is Cheney didn't do any of the math. He merely pronounced that Hussein's possible possession of WMD meant that a Tipping Point had already been reached, and that the Precautionary Principle mandated our intervention. But pronouncing it doesn't make it so. There are solid philosophical arguments against both the Tipping Point and the Precautionary Principle, and well-educated and intelligent people on both sides of the fence. And this argument extends to the application of both concepts to climate change. One argument from skeptics is that the Earth has warmed before without reaching a Tipping Point. It may have been warmer than today during Medieval Times, and it certainly has been warmer for most of the period since the end of the last Ice Age. And yet temperatures did eventually decline. In the more remote past, temperatures were dramatically warmer during several periods, but again, temperatures declined. Another argument is that if we rigorously applied the Precautionary Principle to poorly understood phenomena, we would halt all technological progress and innovation. If our society is paralysed by fear of the unknown, we may reject the next invention that might dramatically improve our lives.What disturbs me is that we are willing to discuss in endless detail with incredible amounts of name-calling the causes and effects of global warming, without discussing the validity of using Tipping Points and the Precautionary Principle as guiding lights for how we should react. From what I have seen in the popular media, the use of those terms is very Cheney-esque. People mention the existence of Tipping Points and the Precautionary Principle and assume that that closes the conversation.

### Asteroids

#### The probability of a major asteroid collision is extremely low.

Ivan Bekey, 2009 (International Academy of Astronautics), 2009, Dealing with the Threat to Earth From Asteroids and Comets, accessed April 12, 2011 at <http://iaaweb.org/iaa/Scientific%20Activity/> Study%20Groups /SG%20Commission %203/sg35/sg35finalreport.pdf

Models of the orbit-dependent distribution of taxonomic types among the NEO population have been recently developed 36,(see ref. 35). Coupled to the NEO orbital distribution models discussed above, the statistical knowledge of albedos and densities of NEOs has allowed the calculation of the frequency of impacts on Earth as a function of collision energy (Fig. 1). Ultimately, this is the information that we need in order to assess the real hazard represented by asteroid impacts and to decide the appropriate actions to counteract this menace. Again, the fact that models-despite being constructed in very different ways and calibrated on disjoint observation datasets- agree with each other at a very fine level, shows that NEO science has now reached a high degree of accuracy. Figure 1 shows that collisions liberating an energy of 1,000 MT should happen on average only once every 65,000 years. They are due to NEOs of about 250-300 m in size.

#### An asteroid impact is unlikely anytime in the near future.

Graham Swinerd, 2008 (Prof., Engineering, U. of Southampton), HOW SPACECRAFT FLY, 2008, 245.

\*Impacts of the magnitude of the Yucatan event fortunately do not happen often -- about once every 100 million years. So it is probably something we do not need to worry about for a long time.

#### The disads outweigh the case: Even astronomers think that asteroids rank below war, disease, and famine as risks to be dealt with:

Clark R. **Chapman, 2004** (Southwest Research Institute, March 4, 2004, <http://www.b612foundation.org/papers/Chapman_hazard_EPSL.pdf>.)

7. Evaluation of the modern impact hazard Unlike other topics in astronomy (except solar flares and coronal mass ejections), only the impact hazard presents serious practical issues for society. Contrasting with most practical issues involving meteorology, geology and geophysics, the impact hazard is both more extreme in potential conse-quences and yet so rare that it has not even been experienced in more than minor ways in historical times. It has similarities to natural hazards in that its practical manifestations mainly involve familiar destructive processes, such as fire, high winds, earthquakes, falling debris and floods. The impact hazard also ranks with other natural disasters in the **mid-range of risks of death** [67]: **much less impor-tant than war,** disease, famine, automobile accidents or murder but much more important than shark attacks, botulism, fireworks accidents or terrorism. Yet, impacts differ from natural disasters because the hazard is mainly not location-dependent (impacts happen anywhere, not just along faults, although ocean impact effects are amplified along coastlines) and there are no precursor or after-shock events.

### Space Lasers/Heg

#### Space based weapons turns heg – it would have a negative effect on the national security of the U.S. – their vulnerability would negate their advantages, they would cause enemies to develop their own space weapons reducing the current advantage of U.S. conventional forces and strategic depth, and are based on a space centric focus that ignores terrestrially based forces.

Hardesty ‘5

Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy, a member of the faculty of the Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department. “Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives”. Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, Vol. 58, No. 2

In the event, this analysis indicates that space-based weapons, though in the short term increasing military capabilities, are in the long term very likely to have a negative effect on the national security of the United States. Specifically, I will argue, the vulnerabilities of space-based systems would largely negate their projected advantages. Further, potential enemies would react to U.S. deployments, either avoiding their effects or, more ominously, space-basing weapons of their own. These deployments would fundamentally reduce the current relative advantages the United States enjoys in conventional forces and strategic depth—reducing the time and distance in which effective defenses must be created. Arguments for the necessity of space-basing weapons are politically untenable, based on false assumptions, or narrowly focused on space-centric concepts that fail to integrate and take full advantage of capabilities of terrestrially based forces. Finally, I will propose a balanced policy and strategy that should optimize maintenance of relative advantages while hedging against uncooperative adversaries.

#### Space lasers mean China and Russia have to first strike to prevent the total loss of their effective nuclear deterrent- means the perception of the plan opening up space weapons development is enough to cause extinction

Hitchens ‘3

Theresa Hitchens, directs the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., and leads its Space Security Project, in cooperation with the Secure World Foundation. She is author of Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course (2004) and was editor of Defense News from 1998 until 2000. “U.S. Weaponization of Space: Implications for International Security”. October 2, 2003. http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hit05/index.html

The negative consequences of a space arms race are hard to exaggerate, given the inherent offense-dominant nature of space warfare. Space weapons, like any thing else on orbit, are inherently vulnerable and, therefore, best exploited as first-strike weapons. Thus, as Michael Krepon and Chris Clary argue in their monograph, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance,” the hair-trigger postures of the nuclear competition between the United States and Russia during the Cold War would be elevated to the “ultimate high ground” of space. Furthermore, any conflict involving ASAT use is likely to highly escalatory, in particular among nuclear weapons states, as the objective of an attacker would be to eliminate the other side’s capabilities to respond either in kind or on the ground by taking out satellites providing surveillance, communications and targeting. Indeed, U.S. Air Force officials participating in space wargames have discovered that war in space rapidly deteriorates into all-out nuclear war, precisely because it quickly becomes impossible to know if the other side has gone nuclear. Aviation Week and Space Technology quoted one gamer as saying simply: “[If] I don’t know what’s going on, I have no choice but to hit everything, using everything I have.” This should not be surprising to anyone – the United States and the Soviet Union found this out very early in the Cold War, and thus took measures to ensure transparency, such as placing emphasis on early warning radars, developing the “hotline” and pledging to non-interference with national technical means of verification under arms control treaties.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

### Solvency

#### Small reactors do not solve prior problems with nuclear energy

Amory Lovins, American consultant, experimental physicist and 1993 MacArthur Fellow, has been active at the nexus of energy, resources, environment, development, and security in more than 50 countries for 35 years, including 14 years based in England. He is widely considered among the world’s leading authorities on energy, Cofounder, Chairman and Chief Scientist, After two years at Harvard, Mr. Lovins transferred to Oxford, and two years later became a don at 21, receiving in consequence an Oxford MA by Special Resolution (1971) and, later, 11 honorary doctorates of various U.S. and U.K. universities. He has been Regents’ Lecturer at the U. of California both in Energy and Resources and in Economics; Grauer Lecturer at UBC; Luce Visiting Professor at Dartmouth; Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Colorado; Oikos Visiting Professor of Business, U. of St. Gallen; an engineering visiting professor at Peking U.; and 2007 MAP/Ming Professor at Stanford’s School of Engineering., has briefed 21 heads of state, given expert testimony in eight countries and 20+ states, delivered thousands of lectures, and written 31 books and more than 450 papers, In 1980–81 he served on the U.S. Department of Energy’s senior advisory board, and in 1999–2001 and 2006–08, on Defense Science Board task forces on military energy strategy. In 1984 he was elected a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science “for his book Soft Energy Paths and many other noteworthy contributions to energy policy,” in 1988, of the World Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 2001, of the World Business Academy, ““New” nuclear reactors, same old story,” Rocky Mountain Institute, March 21, 2009, http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory, accessed 7-7-2012.

In short, the notion that different or smaller reactors plus wholly new fuel cycles (and, usually, new competitive conditions and political systems) could overcome nuclear energy's inherent problems is not just decades too late, but fundamentally a fantasy. Fantasies are all right, but people should pay for their own. Investors in and advocates of small-reactor innovations will be disappointed. But in due course, the aging advocates of the half-century-old reactor concepts that never made it to market will retire and die, their credulous young devotees will relearn painful lessons lately forgotten, and the whole nuclear business will complete its slow death of an incurable attack of market forces. Meanwhile, the rest of us shouldn't be distracted from getting on with the winning investments that make sense, make money, and really do solve the energy, climate, and proliferation problems, led by business for profit.

#### SMRs present an array of new problems and doesn’t solve preexisting issues with nuclear energy

Dan O’Connor is a Policy Fellow in AEL’s New Energy Leaders Project, “Small Modular Reactors: Miracle, Mirage, or Between?,” Lead Energy, January 4, 2011, http://leadenergy.org/2011/01/small-modular-reactors-miracle-mirage-or-medium/, accessed 9-1-2012.

But even in the stages before the crucial demonstration step, skepticism over the SMR’s promises abounds. The ASME EnComm noted regulatory, financial, operational, and logistical challenges. Treading the uncharted waters of Lego-like power plant construction will not be easy. In a traditional plant, one reactor provides heat for one or a few steam turbines. In an SMR-based plant, each module drives one turbine with its own controls and operators. As such, few of the costs associated with these systems scale down with reactor capacity. The turbines do not come in a complimentary plug-and-play form either – they would have to be built on site. And while decentralization enables partial operation and online refueling, it also introduces the challenge of module co-operation, the need for numerous highly-trained operator personnel, and brand new reviews by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This goes without mentioning the urgent and increased need for a more dynamic national approach to waste storage.

#### SMRs are bad – increase waste, transit, expensive

Matthew Baker, Adjunct Junior Fellow Expertise Asia-Pacific, Energy, and Climate Change issues, “Do Small Modular Reactors Present a Serious Option for the Military’s Energy Needs?,” American Security Project, June 22, 2012, http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do-small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/, accessed 9-1-2012.

Firstly like large reactors, one of the biggest qualms that the public has to nuclear is problems associated with nuclear waste. A more decentralized production of nuclear waste inevitably resulting from an increase in SMRs production was not even discussed. The danger of transporting gas into some military bases in the Middle East is already extremely volatile; dangers of an attack on the transit of nuclear waste would be devastating. Secondly, SMRs pose many of the same problems that regular nuclear facilities face, sometimes to a larger degree. Because SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors and can be installed underground, they can be more difficult to access should an emergency occur. There are also reports that because the upfront costs of nuclear reactors go up as surface area per kilowatt of capacity decreases, SMRs will in fact be more expensive than conventional reactors. Thirdly, some supporters of SMR technology seem to have a skewed opinion of public perception toward nuclear energy. Commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission , William C. Ostendorff, didn’t seem to think that the recent Fukushima disaster would have any impact on the development on SMRs. Opinion polls suggest Americans are more likely to think that the costs of nuclear outweigh its benefits since the Fukushima disaster. For SMRs to be the philosopher’s stone of the military’s energy needs the public needs to be on board. The DESC’s briefing did illustrate the hype that the nuclear community has surrounding SMRs, highlighting some pressing issues surrounding the military’s energy vulnerability. But proponents of SMRs need to be more realistic about the flaws associated with SMRs and realize that the negative impacts of nuclear technology are more costly than its benefits.

# 2nc

### renaissance arguments don’t matter ext.

No Nuclear renaissance.

NEI, 2012, Nuclear Energy Institute, “New Reactor Development,” <http://www.nei.org/112thcongress/new-reactor-development/>

The NRC certified Westinghouse Electric Co.'s revised AP1000 reactor design in December 2011. The AP1000 reactor will be used at the Vogtle facility and at South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.'s V.C. Summer site in Jenkinsville, which was licensed by the NRC in March 2012. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is reviewing 11 license applications for 18 new nuclear reactors. The new NRC licensing process moves the licensing and safety issues to the front of three processes: approval of standardized reactor designs, early site permits, and combined construction and operating licenses. In addition, the licensing process provides greater opportunity for public input at the front end of the project. Costs Electricity generated from nuclear power can be competitive with other new sources of baseload power. This is true even before including the cost impact of potential restrictions on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. Loan Guarantees The Department of Energy loan guarantee program is the most effective program for addressing the major challenge facing new nuclear power plants: construction financing. Loan guarantees through DOE are available for 10 technologies—including nuclear power—that reduce, sequester or avoid greenhouse gas emissions. Recipients of loan guarantees for nuclear energy projects pay a fee and cover all administrative costs incurred by the government program. There is no cost to the taxpayer. In fact, a disciplined process will help lower electricity prices for consumers and will actually make money for the U.S. Treasury. Small Reactor Designs Small reactors will provide energy companies with an array of electricity production options. Their small size (typically fewer than 350 megawatts) and modular construction will allow these reactors to be built in a controlled factory setting, reducing the financing challenge and matching a variety of needs for low-carbon energy.

#### Gold Standard prevents Saudi Prolif- overcomes previous barriers

Sayler 2011 [Kelley Sayler is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues AUG 2, 2011 CSIS “The Wisdom of a U.S.-Saudi Arabia 123 Agreement?” http://csis.org/blog/wisdom-us-saudi-arabia-123-agreement]

Global Security Newswire reported last week that the Obama administration appears poised to launch into discussions with Saudi Arabia on a possible 123 agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. 123 agreements are not, however, without substantial risk, establishing the legal framework for the export of nuclear reactors and dual-use materials as well as the exchange of technical knowledge. If abused, such exports can expand the ability of states to construct military weapons programs under the cover of civilian energy programs, while also compressing the timeline for nuclear acquisition. ¶ Particularly worrisome in the Saudi case is the potential departure from the Gold Standard established by the UAE 123 agreement. If, as has been suggested, the Saudi agreement is concluded without an explicit commitment to abjure reprocessing and enrichment technologies, there could be profound consequences for the administration’s nonproliferation objectives and for the long-term stability of the Middle East.¶ ¶ By and large Saudi Arabia has not been previously judged to be a proliferation threat. As Thomas Lipmann notes in The Nuclear Tipping Point, Saudi Arabia “lacks the technological expertise, industrial base, and disciplined commitment required to develop an indigenous weapons capacity.” Recent developments, however, may have altered Saudi Arabia’s interest in nuclear weapons. For example, the alacrity with which the United States dispensed of its long-standing support for the regime of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak no doubt gave pause to the House of Saud, which continues – 30 years later – to be troubled by American abandonment of the Shah on the eve of the Iranian revolution. Nor is Saudi threat perception likely to be relieved by the regional meddling of its frequent ideological competitor. This is to say nothing of the Kingdom’s serious concerns regarding Iranian weaponization.¶ ¶ Indeed, Saudi Arabia appears increasingly unnerved by the trajectory of the Iranian program, a trend that can be seen in the country’s shifting characterizations of its own nuclear ambitions. For example, Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal responded to a 2003 Guardian report that the country was “prepared to contemplate the nuclear option” by stating that “although, like all governments, we constantly reconsider our policies in the light of events, we do not have and are not considering acquiring nuclear weapons.” Contrast this with Turki’s recent assertion that Iranian nuclear acquisition “would compel Saudi Arabia to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences," and it is clear that Saudi discomfort is growing. ¶ ¶ Given these developments, it seems possible that the Kingdom could be prompted to reconsider its policy of nuclear abstinence, and that, if so, a nuclear energy agreement could provide the means of circumventing the country’s technological and industrial deficiencies. ¶ ¶ This is all the more the case because, as Lippman explains,¶ ¶ The credibility of Saudi disclaimers of interest in nuclear weapons has been reinforced by the fact that Saudi Arabia, unlike Iran, has never sought to acquire commercial nuclear power generating plants…Because energy, in the form of crude oil and natural gas, is the one natural resource Saudi Arabia possesses in abundance, no proposal for nuclear power would be credible.¶ ¶ If Lippman is correct, then the Saudi interest in a 123 agreement would seem suspect and, at any rate, should be approached with caution and an eye towards securing the Gold Standard pioneered by the UAE 123. In the absence of such a commitment, the United States risks contributing to the Middle East’s next nuclear weapons program. ¶ ¶ And while the administration may argue that the development of a Saudi nuclear program is inevitable and should therefore occur under the direction of Washington’s watchful eye, any decision to grant a 123 agreement to a non-nuclear weapons state without an attendant Gold Standard commitment would not only threaten a nascent precedent that is highly beneficial to the nonproliferation regime but also deliver the United States to the “deadly adversary" of fatalism, a prospect that President Obama has rightly rejected. Rather than assuming the inevitability of a Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement – and conceding key nonproliferation objectives as a result – the Obama administration should instead seek to resolve Saudi concerns regarding the Gold Standard and encourage the Saudis to assume a leadership role in the nonproliferation regime.

#### Extinction

Eric Edelman et al (Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense) and Andrew Krepinevich (President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment) and Evan Montgomery (Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) February 2011 “The dangers of a nuclear Iran” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf

### There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also ordered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of di⁄cult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three

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### Now Key

#### This is the key time for negotiations on the gold standard- multiple 123 agreements coming up

Lewis 2012 [Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. AUGUST 1, 2012 “It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3]

The Obama administration largely finds itself an accidental architect of the new civil nuclear order. In addition to a new wave of countries seeking nuclear help from the United States, many 123 agreements that were negotiated 30 years ago -- during the last wave of enthusiasm for nuclear power -- will expire between now and 2014. When this flurry of activity ends, the United States will have negotiated more than a dozen nuclear cooperation agreements in a four-year period, many with the most important emerging nuclear powers. Dick Stratford, a senior State Department official, told a conference that he carried around a little list in his pocket because he had trouble keeping all the negotiations straight.

#### Gold standard is being adopted and modeled- its under review though

Grossman 2012 [Elaine M. Grossman is a reporter with Global Security Newswire, covering issues related to nuclear arms, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. She is a veteran national security and foreign affairs reporter whose articles have won 13 national journalism awards July 19, 2012 National Journal “Taiwan Ready to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making in U.S. Trade Pact Renewal” http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/taiwan-ready-to-forgo-nuclear-fuel-making-in-u-s-trade-pact-renewal-20120719]

The government of Taiwan is prepared to renounce any right to produce nuclear fuel in a forthcoming renewal of its 40-year-old atomic energy cooperation agreement with the United States, according to officials from both nations (see GSN, May 4).¶ If Taiwan proceeds as expected, the East Asian island nation would be the first U.S. nuclear energy partner state to make such a pledge since the United Arab Emirates promised in a 2009 trade agreement that it would not enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on its territory.¶ The UAE accord has been widely hailed as a significant step for nuclear nonproliferation. The Obama administration three years ago dubbed it the “gold standard” for future atomic trade agreements around the globe. ¶ “This is proof that there are at least two countries -- and probably more -- out there that are willing to undertake a legally binding gold standard in their nuclear cooperation agreement,” one congressional source said on Wednesday. “[It] helps establish a new global precedent that enrichment and reprocessing aren’t necessary for a truly civil nuclear program.” ¶ Lacking permission to address the issue publicly, this source and other Capitol Hill aides agreed to be interviewed for this article on condition of not being named.¶ Since the UAE agreement was inked, senior administration officials have been divided over whether the gold standard should become the norm for additional nuclear commerce pacts or if, instead, this type of restriction on activities should be included only on a “case-by-case” basis.¶ State and Energy department officials adopted the latter policy early this year, but immediately drew sharp criticism from Democrats and Republicans alike for backing away from a potentially useful nonproliferation tool (see GSN, Jan. 23).¶ Enrichment and reprocessing can be useful for peaceful atomic energy -- the focus of such trade pacts -- in terms of producing fuel for nuclear power plants. It also could open the door, though, to the diversion of fissile material for clandestine efforts to develop an atomic weapon. By contrast, a renunciation of these activities could boost confidence that a partner nation would not build an illicit bomb, and help hold other states accountable for their nuclear activities.¶ The administration recently suspended implementation of the case-by-case negotiating policy and threw the matter back into interagency review. A White House decision regarding when and how vigorously to pursue the gold standard remains pending, well placed sources said.

#### US nuclear leadership is high because of the gold standard-we are about to sign a wreck of 123 agreements- that leadership solves bad reactor sales now

Grossman 2011 [Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire Jan. 25, 2011 NTI “Obama Team Eyes Saudi Nuclear Trade Deal Without Nonproliferation Terms” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-team-eyes-saudi-nuclear-trade-deal-without-nonproliferation-terms/]

Over the next few years, the United States is also expected to initiate and renew a dozen or more nuclear trade agreements with various nations around the globe. Nonproliferation advocates see this as a potential opportunity for Washington to solidify a standard that could pay dividends down the road.¶ "You've got the UAE," said one Capitol Hill aide. "If you can get Jordan and another country beyond that -- three countries that voluntarily foreswear reprocessing -- then you've got a real precedent forming."¶ After such a precedent is established, the burden would then be on other states to explain why they would demand to preserve a right to enrich or reprocess, the staffer said.¶ "This gold standard might be quite difficult to implement, but the U.S. should not stop trying to restrict the spread of these technologies," said Squassoni, who directs her organization's Proliferation Prevention Program. "Otherwise we may find ourselves in a race to the bottom against competitors like the French and Koreans, who are more likely to win contracts."¶ If U.S. companies are already losing global nuclear energy contracts to foreign competition anyway, Washington might as well take the high road in maintaining a high nonproliferation standard, one congressional aide said.¶ "If we want this to be a standard, we have to do the legwork with our allies," Squassoni said. It will take concerted diplomacy and arm-twisting to ensure that other nuclear energy purveyors adhere to the same restrictions on their sales, she said.

#### We will continue to push the gold standard- the plan breaks a stalemate between departments though

Grossman 2011 [Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire Jan. 25, 2011 NTI “Obama Team Eyes Saudi Nuclear Trade Deal Without Nonproliferation Terms” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-team-eyes-saudi-nuclear-trade-deal-without-nonproliferation-terms/]

Another aide noted that it was the Obama team that strengthened the UAE pact by adding Abu Dhabi's explicit pledge on enrichment and processing, augmenting the right-of-return disincentives that the Bush administration had earlier secured. The current administration even gave the provisions the "gold standard" moniker.¶ "So they're in a little bit of a spot here," the aide said. "This is something they helped to create."¶ The issue appears to be left at stalemate within the administration, several insiders indicated.¶

#### Saudi Arabia and Jordan will sign Gold Standard pledges now

Grossman 2012 [Elaine Grossman Global Security Newswire May 4, 2012 National Journal “Nuclear Trade Reform Bill Faces Hostile Lobbying, as Obama Team Renews Policy Review” http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/nuclear-trade-reform-bill-faces-hostile-lobbying-as-obama-team-renews-policy-review-20120504]

Recent events, though, may have overtaken this contention. Word on Capitol Hill is that, in dialogue with Washington diplomats, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have both indicated a willingness to consider some form of no-enrichment-and-reprocessing pledge in respective bilateral accords. The U.S. government has not addressed the latest details of these ongoing talks in public statements.

#### Gold Standard now- heads win out over wallets

Grossman 2012 [Elaine Grossman Global Security Newswire May 4, 2012 National Journal “Nuclear Trade Reform Bill Faces Hostile Lobbying, as Obama Team Renews Policy Review” http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/nuclear-trade-reform-bill-faces-hostile-lobbying-as-obama-team-renews-policy-review-20120504]

The debate revolves mainly around the “gold standard,” a provision that could be included in U.S. nuclear-cooperation agreements under which partner nations would pledge not to domestically enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. ¶ These activities can be useful for peaceful nuclear power--the focus of the trade agreements--but also might open the door to clandestine efforts to develop an atomic weapon. ¶ The United Arab Emirates agreed in a 2009 pact with the United States to forsake any enrichment or reprocessing. That led to a debate in Washington as to whether such trade agreements with other nations should include a similar gold-standard promise. ¶ Advocates said this could help prevent future copycats of Iran’s nuclear program, which is widely suspected of having a military dimension despite Tehran’s insistence that it remains dedicated only to peaceful power generation and research.¶ The House legislation, cosponsored by committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., and ranking member Howard Berman, D-Calif., would allow only those trade accords that include the gold standard to be implemented after 90 days of continuous congressional session, unless lawmakers act to stop them. This is seen as a relatively light form of congressional review that typically results in a pact going forward.¶ For agreements that do allow the buyer nation to enrich or reprocess, the bill would involve a higher test: It would require a congressional vote of approval before going into effect. ¶ As things stand under current law, the Atomic Energy Act is relatively permissive, allowing any so-called Section 123 nuclear-cooperation agreement to move forward following the 90-day waiting period.¶ A State Department spokesman last week said that the Obama administration continues to oppose the House bill. A July 2011 position paper said that the agency "shares many of the policy objectives reflected in H.R. 1280, but is deeply concerned by many of the bill’s provisions."¶ The administration has said the legislation could make it more difficult for the U.S. nuclear industry to compete for foreign sales and ultimately could deny Washington influence over its prospective trade partners’ nonproliferation policies.¶ Those who support the bill’s objectives see it differently.¶ “The critics’ basic position is that Congress cannot be trusted to consider and vote upon nuclear-cooperation agreements according to their nonproliferation benefits,” asserted one congressional aide this week. “These agreements authorize trade in nuclear reactors and sensitive nuclear exports and could lay the basis for military applications, as in Iran. Sure, Congress can vote on multibillion-dollar free-trade agreements, but not nuclear reactors.”¶ This Capitol Hill aide and several others spoke for this story on condition of not being named, lacking permission to address the issue publicly.¶ Industry advocates are convinced that the taller hurdle for congressional approval would mean that many future nuclear trade accords negotiated by Washington would fall victim to political scuffles, die on the vine, and represent a huge blow to the domestic nuclear sector.¶ “If you didn’t have the gold standard or equivalent language in a ‘123 agreement,’ it would take an affirmative act of both houses to put the agreement in place,” one industry source griped about H.R. 1280 in a late-March interview.¶ “It’s hard enough just to get the requisite 90 continuous session days to put it in front of Congress and actually just sit there and become law,” another industry representative said. “To get both houses to approve a ‘123’ by joint resolution, I think most congressional staffers would tell you that’s kind of a stretch.”¶ Both industry sources demanded anonymity in this article, saying they were not authorized to openly discuss the hotly contested legislation.¶ The U.S. nuclear energy sector has established a significant presence on the Hill and has made H.R. 1280 an important focus. Twenty companies and industry organizations--from the French-based AREVA Group to the U.S. powerhouse Xcel Energy--have paid lobbyists this year and last to explain their positions on this bill, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.¶ Topping the list is the Nuclear Energy Institute, which spent more than $2 million in 2011 for its staff to lobby on legislation that included the Ros-Lehtinen-Berman bill. The group’s rate of spending is up considerably in 2012, with $755,000 already spent on staff lobbyists for this purpose in the year’s first quarter alone, according to CRP data.¶ The industry arm also paid two outside lobbying firms, Kountoupes Consulting and the Mathis Group, a combined total of $160,000 in 2011 and $30,000 to date in 2012 to advocate against H.R. 1280, among other NEI legislative priorities, states information compiled by the watchdog organization.¶ All told, the institute spent more than $3 million in 2011 and more than $1 million thus far this year, using more than two dozen staff lobbyists and external consultants to address with lawmakers and staff all the legislation before Congress that it seeks to affect, CRP data show.¶ Some cite industry lobbying as a key reason why the Foreign Affairs Committee-sponsored bill might never make it to the House floor.¶ “For the moment, too many people in town have been bought,” Sokolski said.¶ The House legislation has stalled for just over a year and the Obama administration’s latest policy review is, by some counts, its third on the same issue since 2009.¶ However, Sokolski voiced confidence that the global consequences of nuclear proliferation and a need for more serious response measures will, at some point, carry the day.¶ “In time, they’ll listen to their conscience rather than their wallet,” he said of elected officials.

### 2NC Link Wall

#### The aff ensures the industry gets their way- now is key for the decision to export reprocessing

Grossman 2012 [Elaine M. Grossman is a reporter with Global Security Newswire, covering issues related to nuclear arms, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. She is a veteran national security and foreign affairs reporter whose articles have won 13 national journalism awards July 19, 2012 National Journal “Taiwan Ready to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making in U.S. Trade Pact Renewal” http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/taiwan-ready-to-forgo-nuclear-fuel-making-in-u-s-trade-pact-renewal-20120719]

Internal Obama administration dissent over the nuclear trade negotiating policy goes back to fall 2010, when Poneman, the Energy deputy, squared off with then-Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg (see GSN, Jan. 25, 2011). ¶ Steinberg, who subsequently left the government in July 2011, is reported to have argued that advocating for the gold standard around the world would help Obama honor his 2009 pledge in Prague to pursue “an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials.”¶ Poneman’s view, echoed by U.S. industry advocates, is said to been that demanding a gold-standard promise could alienate partner nations. Rather than agree to Washington’s terms, such interlocutors could easily send their business to international competitors that impose fewer restrictions on nuclear sales, including Russia and France. ¶ One interagency compromise that appeared to gel over the past year was to maintain the gold standard in the Middle East, where the United Arab Emirates retains a right to withdraw its pledge if a U.S. pact with another country in the region allows that partner to reprocess or enrich.¶ There are strong objections to a region-by-region approach in some quarters, though, fueled by concerns about singling out one region for stricter terms while allowing others around the world more latitude to pursue less proliferation-resistant policies.¶ Internal administration tussles over the matter continue to this day, ultimately leaving the matter for the White House to adjudicate. In the meantime, efforts aimed at concluding nuclear trade deals with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Vietnam have not yet resulted in agreements (see GSN, Jan. 12 and July 28, 2011).

#### The aff makes industry appeals based on market competitiveness more salient

Grossman 2012 [Elaine Grossman Global Security Newswire May 4, 2012 National Journal “Nuclear Trade Reform Bill Faces Hostile Lobbying, as Obama Team Renews Policy Review” http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/nuclear-trade-reform-bill-faces-hostile-lobbying-as-obama-team-renews-policy-review-20120504]

What are members of Congress and their aides hearing from nuclear industry lobbyists about H.R. 1280? Representatives of the energy sector are arguing the United States simply is not in a strong enough position in the global marketplace to start making demands on up-and-coming atomic energy customers, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam.¶ “In decades past … we held a great deal of influence over global commercial nuclear trade, by virtue of our strong, dominant position as a supplier,” said one industry source at the March interview. “And when we added new terms for nuclear trade, the customers would accept them. They didn’t have much of a choice.”¶ Over the past few decades, though, the sector has seen a steep rise in global nuclear energy sellers, including France and Russia. Some of these industry players have successfully undercut their U.S. competitors with government-subsidized prices, according to experts.¶ “It’s really touchy because if you’re in a position where you’re just sort of teetering on whether you’ll even get to be a supplier, you’re not in a position to dictate terms,” the industry source said. “Our competitors will jump on anything that calls into question whether the U.S. is a reliable supplier. And by reliable supplier, you don’t mean just are they going to transfer this technology when you need it. Are they going to be a reliable supplier for the next [several] decades?”

#### Industry influence eliminates Gold Standard for Saudi 123 Agreement

Grossman 2011 [Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire Jan. 25, 2011 NTI “Obama Team Eyes Saudi Nuclear Trade Deal Without Nonproliferation Terms” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-team-eyes-saudi-nuclear-trade-deal-without-nonproliferation-terms/]

The Obama administration is taking initial steps to negotiate a civil nuclear trade pact with Saudi Arabia that could lack key nonproliferation provisions included in a similar 2009 deal with one of Riyadh's Persian Gulf neighbors, according to U.S. officials and experts (see GSN, Nov. 3, 2010).¶ Critics are warning that the approach -- reportedly driven by Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman -- might signal Washington's tacit blessing for the Saudis to reprocess plutonium or enrich uranium on their soil. Such activities can be useful for atomic energy needs but also introduce the potential to advance a clandestine nuclear weapons effort.¶ "They've opened the nuclear tinderbox of the Middle East," one senior Republican congressional aide said last week. "They're playing with nuclear fire."¶ Many nonproliferation experts appear to agree, saying Washington currently has a unique opportunity to head off the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, they say, that opening could disappear if the Obama team fails to seize it.¶ In its 2009 nuclear trade agreement with the United States, the United Arab Emirates volunteered to forgo any domestic enrichment or reprocessing. The pact, initially signed by the Bush administration and later strengthened by the Obama team, also includes a disincentive for reversing course: it gives Washington the right to demand that its nuclear materials are returned if the Emirates were to abandon its pledge.¶ Last August, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley called the UAE nonproliferation provisions the "gold standard" for nuclear trade agreements that Washington negotiates with nations around the world.¶ Leading nonproliferation advocates have urged the White House to pursue a similar commitment to nonproliferation practices from Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries -- if not in other regions, as well. While the Mideast is widely regarded as an area of particular concern, Washington might be reluctant to adopt a policy that singles out Arab nations for stricter limits than those placed on other states, several issue experts noted.¶ "It goes to the argument over what is possible to achieve in nonproliferation on a global level," said one congressional source.¶ This staffer and several other Washington officials from both political parties were interviewed on condition of not being named in this story. They were not authorized to speak publicly about the simmering policy debate over global trade in sensitive nuclear materials.¶ Lawmakers on Capitol Hill signaled their ire last summer after learning that the administration did not intend to advocate a renunciation of domestic enrichment and reprocessing in negotiating nuclear trade deals with Jordan and Vietnam.¶ In response, the Obama team agreed to review whether the gold standard should be applied to upcoming agreements, even while quietly acknowledging that neither Hanoi nor Amman were inclined to accept the clear type of assurance embraced by the United Arab Emirates.¶ In a series of closed-door meetings, the National Security Council debated what the policy on the standard should entail, but was unable to reach consensus on the matter, according to administration insiders.¶ During a key agency deputies meeting last fall, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg reportedly argued that nonproliferation concerns must weigh significantly into U.S. decisions about nuclear cooperation. Adherence to a high standard would help honor President Obama's 2009 pledge in Prague to pursue "an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials" and serve as a model for the rest of the world, according to Steinberg's thinking.¶ However, Poneman insisted that Washington must not impose restrictions on what some nations regard as a right to peaceful nuclear power, insider sources said. The outcome of any such effort, he believes, could be that the U.S. nuclear energy industry will be put at a disadvantage, losing business to nations such as France or South Korea that impose fewer restrictions on foreign sales of nuclear technology and materials.¶ Katinka Podmaniczky, Poneman's spokeswoman at the Energy Department, declined any comment on the matter.¶ Gary Samore, the NSC coordinator for arms control and nonproliferation, in November confirmed that the issue was before Obama to decide (see GSN, Nov. 19, 2010).¶ Crowley told Global Security Newswire last week that the matter remains under study but that the Obama administration does not regard the UAE precedent as one that necessarily should be applied to other nations.¶ "We approach these negotiations on a country-by-country basis," the State Department spokesman said in an e-mailed response to questions. "We are still reviewing the best course of action going forward. We do not have a set schedule. Country by country, these agreements are based on mutual interests and are not affected by arrangements with other countries."¶ Pending a presidential decision, it has been left to the Energy and State departments to sort out how they would approach anticipated talks with Saudi Arabia aimed at landing a formal agreement on terms for their future nuclear trade, Washington sources said.¶ Indications are that Poneman recently advised the State Department -- the lead U.S. agency for international negotiations -- that Washington need not press Saudi Arabia to accept nonproliferation provisions similar to those in the UAE accord, according to government sources.

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#### SPACE WEAPONS TECH HARD—MASSIVE TECH HURDLES

Theresa **Hitchens**, Vice President, Center for Defense Information, “Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization,” DISARMAMENT FORUM n. 1, 20**03**, pp. 15-32.

The barriers to development and deployment of actual space-based weapons are much, much higher, even for the American military. There are fundamental technical obstacles to the development of kinetic kill weapons and lasers both for use against targets in space and terrestrial targets, and the costs associated with launch and maintaining systems on-orbit are staggering. For example, problems with lasers include power generation requirements adding to size, the need for large quantities of chemical fuel and refuelling requirements, and the physics of propagating and stabilizing beams across long distances or through the atmosphere. Space-based kinetic energy weapons have major challenges, too, including achieving proper orbital trajectories and velocities, the need to carry massive amounts of propellant, and concern about damage to one’s own forces from debris resulting from killing an enemy satellite. Space-based weapons also have the problem of vulnerability, for example, predictable orbits and the difficulty of regeneration. A detailed discussion of the technology challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, but a good primer on the innumerable problems with developing space-based weapons is a September 1999 paper by Maj. William L. Spacy II, ‘Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?’ written for the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. A new study by RAND’s Project Air Force, Space Weapons/Earth Wars, also details technological challenges to various types of space-based weapons that might be used against terrestrial targets. The study further lists several general limitations of space-based weapons and defences, explaining that space weapons face exactly the same vulnerability problems that satellite networks do.37 The truth of the matter is that technology (not to mention cost) is a crucial limiting factor for the development of satellite networks, ASATs and space weapons—and explains why only a limited number of countries are now so capable.

#### SPACE WEAPONIZATION NOT INEVITABLE

 Deblois ‘98

Bruce M., Lt. Colonel, USAF, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable Naitonal Strategy,” Airpower Journal, 41-57//dch-mac]

Much of the literature flowing from the Department of Defense (DOD) on space and its role for future military operations makes a fundamental assumption: “Space will be weaponized; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead.”2 One cannot so readily make such an assumption. The immediate military advantages of being the first nation to weaponize space are undeniable3 but must be weighed against long-term military costs, as well as against broader social, political, and economic costs. The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking short-term military advantage in support of national security) but at the higher level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and worldwide legitimacy of US constitutional values). At that level, many reasons suggest why the weaponization of space may not be the obvious “best” strategy.

#### SPACE WEAPONIZATION SABOTAGES US-RUSSIAN TNW CONTROL NEGOTIATION

 The Independent ‘05

[“Russia’s warning over ‘Star Wars,’” June 3, LN//uwyo-ajl]

MOSCOW Russia's defence minister threatened retaliation if any country put weapons in space. Sergei Ivanov said Russia would not negotiate controls over tactical nuclear arms with nations that deployed them abroad. In a comment aimed squarely at the US, he said: 'We are categorically against the militarisation of space.'

#### WEAPONIZATION CREATES CASCADING ORBITING DEBRIS CLOUDS—DESTROY MOST SATELLITES, CRUSHING COMMERCE AND EXPLORATION

Rebecca **Johnson**, Director, Disarmament and Arms Control Program, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, “Security Without Weapons in Space: Challenges and Options,” DISARMAMENT FORUM n. 1, 2**003**, pp. 53-65.

For many technological and political reasons, a high altitude nuclear detonation is unlikely, though in an age of asymmetric warfare, it cannot be completely ruled out. A much more immediate danger to commercial and military assets in space, already arising from careless human actions in the first forty-five years of space activities, comes from space-crowding and orbital debris. LEO is teeming with human generated debris, defined by NASA as ‘any man-made object in orbit about the Earth which no longer serves a useful purpose’. There are some 9,000 objects larger than 10cm and over 100,000 smaller objects. As orbiting debris may be travelling at very high velocities, even tiny fragments can pose a significant risk to satellites or spacecraft, as experienced by US astronaut Sally Ride, when an orbiting fleck of paint gouged the window of the Space Shuttle during her first flight.22 If instead of paint, the projectile had been harder or larger, it could have put the lives of the crew at risk. As noted by Joel Primack, one of the premier experts on the problems of space debris, ‘the weaponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes’.23 Such a scenario would cause the Earth to be effectively entombed, jeopardizing the possibility of further space exploration and greatly complicating civilian uses. In addition, Primack speculates that even a small number of ‘hits’ in space could create sufficient debris to cause a cascade of further fragmentation (a kind of chain reaction). This, in turn, could potentially damage the Earth’s environment and, as the Sun’s rays reflect off the dust, cause permanent light pollution, condemning us to a ‘lingering twilight’.24